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NOTES

SUCCESSIONS-MAXIMUM BENEFIT TO ADULTEROUS ILLEGITIMATE

CHnmD--A will was attacked by the deceased's widow on the

ground that the sole beneficiary was his adulterous illegitimate
child who could only receive alimony. The trial judge attempted
to protect the interests of both the child and the heirs by declaring the will null and imposing on the estate a charge of alimony
for the child.' Held, that in the absence of proof that the legacy

was excessive for the child's sustenance, the will was valid. Succession of Haydel, 188 La. 646, 177 So. 695 (1937).
The determination of this issue had to be in conformity with
Article 14882 which provides that natural fathers and mothers
can only dispose of property in favor of their adulterous or incestuous illegitimate children to the extent of "what is necessary to
their sustenance or to procure them an occupation or profession
by which to support themselves." Although Article 9203 allows
adulterous or incestuous children nothing more than "mere alimony" and specifically denies to them the right of inheriting the
estates of their natural father or mother, Article 14884 does not
treat of alimony but of the disposition of the property itself. The
holding of the trial judge failed to take into account the distinction between Articles 920 and 1488 and treated the matter as in1. Succession of Haydel, 188 La. 646, 647, 177 So. 695, 696 (1937). As a
consequence of such a determination, in the event of the child's death before
the entire disposition of the estate the balance would be left with the heirs
of the testator rather than go to the heirs of the child.
2. La. Civil Code of 1870. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1937-1938 Term (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 314, 358.
3. Art. 920, La. Civil Code of 1870 appears under the heading: "Of Irregular Successions."
4. Art. 1488, La. Civil Code of 1870 appears under the heading: "Of the
Capacity Necessary for Disposing and Receiving by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa."
Article 1488 was probably suggested by the projet of the French Civil
Code although the final redaction of that Code excluded it therefrom:
Projet de la Commission du Gouvernement (1800) 275-276, Book III, Title
IX, Art. 12. "Les enfants adultdrins ou incestueux ne peuvent rien recevoir
en propridtd de lour pdre ni di lour mere.
"Ies no peuvent mdme recevoir do lour pdre ou mdre, en usufruit, et 4
ttre de pension alimentaire, av-deld de ce que la lot lour accorde au titre des
successions."'
(Translation) "Adulterous or incestuous children can receive nothing in
ownership from their father or their mother.
"They cannot even receive from their father or mother, in usufruct, and
in the way of alimentary allowance, anything over and above that which
the law permits them in the title of successions."
Thus it will be seen that our Article 1488 is much broader in scope than
its corresponding Article in the projet of the Code Napoleon in that the latter
restricts the child to that which "the law permits . . . in the title of successions"-namely, alimony, while the former is applicable to dispositions mortis
causa-with our Article 920 treating of alimony.
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volving a question of alimony, rather than a donation mortis
causa. Under Article 1488 the child may receive a certain amount
of property in full ownership, whereas Article 920 makes reference only to alimony. Hence, the parent may either leave property to the adulterous or incestuous child by will, 5 or else, in the
absence of any alimentary bequest in favor of the child, the law
will impose upon the estate a charge of alimony." The "mere alimony" spoken of in Article 920 must be determined by the court
in view of the age of the child, its needs, its customary manner
of living and the size of the succession,7 and "what is necessary
to their sustenance" according to Article 1488 must likewise depend upon the factual situation of each particular case., An excessive disposition would be subject to reduction.'
The decision of the instant case shows up the anomaly that
an illegitimate child who is incapable of acknowledgment ° or
legitimation 1 can receive more than an acknowledged child.
Thus, if the legatee had the status of an acknowledged child she
5. Art. 1488, La. Civil Code of 1870; Succession of Elmore, 124 La. 91, 49
So. 989 (1909). The Elmore case did not treat the legacy as a matter of alimony, but as a disposition mortis causa of property. Cf. Succession of Taylor,
15 La. Ann. 313 (1860); Bennett v. Cane, 18 La. Ann. 590 (1866); Succession of
Vance, 110 La. 760, 34 So. 767 (1903). All of these cases were overruled by
the Elmore decision In which it was stated that "whatever there may appear
to be contrary to this In the decisions in the cases of" Succession of Taylor,
Bennett v. Cane and Succession of Vance "must yield to the plain text of the
Code." (124 La. at 92, 49 So. at 990.)
6. Art. 241, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Illegitimate children have a right to
claim this alimony, not only from their father and mother, but even from
their heirs after their death." (Italics supplied.)
In the light of this codal provision, the child is insured alimony whether
the parent dies intestate or disposes of his property mortis causa without
making provision for the child to the limit permitted by Article 1488. However, in order for an adulterous or incestuous illegitimate to have the right
to sue for alimony, it must (according to Article 242) in addition to proving
its absolute need, have been judicially declared (in conformity with Articles
208, 209 and 212) to be the child of the person from whom it claims alimony.
7. O'Gara v. Succession of Riddell, 19 La. Ann. 504 (1867).
8. "It is not claimed by the appellee, either in her pleadings or by argument of her counsel, nor do the facts disclosed by the record show, that the
amount of the legacy is excessive for the purpose contemplated under Article
1488." Succession of Haydel, 188 La. 646, 651, 177 So. 695, 697 (1937).
9. Succession of Elmore, 124 La. 91, 92, 49 So. 989, 990 (1909): "Nothing
could be more illogical than to annul altogether the will of the testator because he has sought to give more than the law allows him to give. In such
a case there is abundant reason for reducing the donation, but absolutely
none for annulling it altogether. ...
"Article 1488, which is the only one regulating the capacity of the adulterous parent to dispose by will in favor of his adulterine child, does not
pronounce a total incapacity, but leaves a margin. Within this margin the
will is just as valid as a will can be; and where the courts would find authority for annulling It is not even suggested."
10. Art. 204, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Arts. 198, 200, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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could have received by donation inter vivos or mortis causa only
one-fourth or one-third of the testator's property, depending upon
whether "he leaves legitimate ascendants or legitimate brothers
or sisters or descendants from such brothers and sisters," or
whether "he leaves only more remote collateral relatives,"' 2 while
in the present case, although the legatee is an adulterous illegitimate, she is nevertheless the sole beneficiary. 1 In general, the
natural or acknowledged child is given greater privileges than
other illegitimate children. While the former are severely restricted in their capacity to receive benefits, 14 the anomaly in
favor of the latter cannot be broken because it exists by virtue of
positive provisions of the Civil Code. 15 Furthermore, the decision
in the instant case is a just and equitable one and in line with the
modern trend toward a more lenient legal attitude with respect
to illegitimates. 16
From a purely social viewpoint, it is in the interest of the
state to encourage and preserve the marriage contract by relying
upon the stimulus of parental affection as a discouragement of
unsanctified cohabitation. It is open to question whether the attempt to remove this evil by superimposing financial loss upon
the unavoidable social and emotional handicaps which the offspring of such illicit relations must bear is conducive of the best
results. However, the policy of the civil law is as much concerned with the interest of the illegitimate in protecting it from
further penalties for the sins of its parents, for which it can in
no way be blamed.1 7 The positive provisions of the Civil Code in
assuring the child financial legal protection adequately insures it
against becoming a burden upon the state.
J. B.
12. Art. 1486, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. No mention of this argument is made in the decision of the principal
case. For a full treatment of the various problems arising from such a situation, see: Succession of Vance, 110 La. 760, 764-765, 34 So. 767, 768-769 (1903).
14. Arts. 918, 919, 921, 924-927, 1483-1486, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. Arts. 920, 1488, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. For a complete survey on this problem, see: 4 Vernier, American
Family Laws (1936) 189-205, § 249. It will be noted that Louisiana has made
greater advances than most jurisdictions in bestowing greater privileges
upon the illegitimate. As to the rights of blood parents to adopt their incestuous or adulterous illegitimates who cannot be acknowledged or legitimated,
see Comment (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 196, 197.
17. Daggett, The Social Attitude of the Civil Law in the United States
(1937) 15 Social Forces 554, 561-562.

